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Abstract
In the past, with few exceptions, the railroad industry has been
financed and its economic performance evaluated on strictly private-
sector standards. Competing forms of transport have been in large part
government financed, and to some extent, especially waterways, subsidized.
Optimality in the transport system can be attained only if governments —
Federal, state, local — treat all forms of transport equally. This
necessitates governmental participation in the financing of the railroad
industry, both in the provision of capital and the financing of deficits
in some instances. At present, the railroads are subject to an interest
burden on track improvements, whereas there is no similar burden on
highway and waterways carriers. Further support for governmental participa-
tion is provided by the important externalities offered by rail service,
the need for insuring survival of railroads in periods of depression,
the meeting of deficits on lines with marginal cost less than average
cost but nevertheless economically justifiable, the urgency for drastic
revision of labor contracts, which the railroads are probably not able
to do alone, and aid in restructuring of the rail network.
Some progress has been made along these lines in the last decade;
the present administration, however, is returning to the old private-
sector standards, unsympathetic to governmental participation in the
areas noted. Only with regard to increased user charges on competing
transport, deregulation, and attitudes toward labor is the new administra-
tion sympathetic to a solution of the rail problems.

GOVERNMENT VS. PRIVATE FINANCING OF THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY*
John F. Due
Professor of Economics
University of Illinois, Urbana
This paper is concerned with financing of the railroad industry in two
respects: (l) the provision of capital, and (2) the meeting of deficits.
By "government" is meant not only the Federal government hut the states and
local governments as well. The first portion of the paper outlines the
optimal role of government in financing of the railroad industry, the second
part the prospects for attainment of the optimum. Under the present political
environment, the gap is extremely wide. But political environments change
over time.
The basic philosophy of the paper is that optimal efficiency in freight
transportation in the United States requires that the railroads be treated,
so far as the role of government in financing is concerned, in a fashion
as close as possible to that of the trucking and barge industries, after
recognition of inherent differences among the industries. It is obvious
that Pareto optimality cannot be attained unless this rule is followed. The
philosophy is widely accepted in principle; it has been widely violated in
practice. Since government financing occurs with both highways and waterways,
and this is almost certain to continue, government participation in financing
of the railway industry is essential for equality of treatment. But historically
the railroads have been regarded as wholly in the private sector (with a
few exceptions such the provision of land grants in the last century), while
highways and waterways have been almost exclusively in the public sector.
Thus railway investment has been evaluated on private sector profit making
rules almost entirely, except to a limited extent in recent years, while
highways and waterways have not.
^Prepared for presentation at the meetings of the Transportation and
Public Utilities Group, American Economic Association, Washington, D.G.,
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The Justifications for Governmental Participation in Railroad Financing
There are several justifications for governmental participation in the
financing of the railroad industry.
1. Equality of treatment with competing industries.
Waterway improvements have been universally financed "by the Federal govern-
ment, a tradition dating back for nearly two centuries. These have been
financed, as is usual with the Federal government, out of current revenues.
Until the last two years, the users have paid nothing for the use of waterways,
and the present charges are nominal. Partly because of the absence of charges,
waterways improvements have enjoyed very strong lobbying support from farm
groups and other bulk shippers, localities benefitting, and the Corps of Army
Engineers. For decades some of the improvements—and the Columbia River
was an extreme example—did nothing more than pull down rail rates. Traffic
continued to move by rail, and the investments constituted complete economic
waste. The overall ultimate result has been to lower, artificially, the
costs of barge transport, shifting a substantial amount of traffic from
the railways, and depressing many rail rates to the point at which they
contribute little to common costs.
Likewise, highways have been built by governments. Unlike waterways,
truck lines have contributed substantially to the support of highway costs,
although most studies suggest that the large vehicles are not paying
adequate amounts relative to the additional costs for which they are responsible.
Furthermore, with both highways and waterways, no interest burden is incurred
by the carriers for the improvements. While waterway and highway improvements
are typically financed from current government revenues, a real interest
burden is incurred, in the sense that the revenues used to finance the
improvements could have been placed in income yielding investments if they
had not been used for the transport improvements.
1. J.F. Due, Hails to the MidColumbia Wheatlands (Washington, D.C. : Universit;
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By contrast, the railroads must provide their own capital for replacements
and improvements. If these sums are financed by earned depreciation reserves
or profits, interest earnings are foregone; if not, a contractual interest
burden is assumed. With interest rates held artificially high by Federal
Reserve policy, the capital problem is particularly severe. A Department
of Transportation study in 1978 showed a potential shortfall of capital in
the railroad industry of between $13 and $16 billion dollars over the 1979-80
period. The National Transportation Policy Study Commission concluded that
capital requirements from 1976 to 2000 (in 1975 dollars) would range between
2$ll6.7 billion and $332.8 billion. Without governmental participation, invest-
ment in railway improvements will be artificially low compared to that in
waterways and highways.
Under one proposal the government would buy and maintain the railway
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track, charging the railroads for the use on a competitive bid basis. On a
nationwide scale, this approach would involve large Federal outlays. But the
more serious question is the inevitable conflict between the government as
owner of the lines and the railroads as operators on them, and the determination
of maintenance expenditures by area and line on the basis of political considera-
tions. Competition among several" lifies operating on the same line is impossible,
since it is not technically feasible to allow a number of railroads to operate
on the same track, as experience has demonstrated very clearly. Even with
two lines and with voluntarily negotiated agreements there have been problems,
particularly over train priorities.
While widespread Federal ownership of the rail lines is open to serious
question, state or local government purchase of deteriorated lines which have
1. A Prospectus for Change in the Railroad Freight Industry (Washington: 1978)
2. National Transportation Policy through the Year 2000 (Washington; 1979).
3. For example, Bruce Harmon, "A Railway Trust Fund," Transportation Research
Vol. 8 (197*0 PP. 363-72; D.P. Ainsworth and P .V . Stone, Public Ownership of
Fixed Plant (Greenwich, Conn.: Reebie Associates, 1979) i M.J. Hirschey, Government
Ownership and Operation of Railroad Rights of Way: Pros and Cons (Madison:
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 1975)
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economic justification, with rehabilitation and transfer to local companies
for operation, has merit, particularly in insuring to shippers that the state
or local government is serious about ensuring continued operation of the line.
An alternative to government participation in the financing of the railroad
industry "because of the governmental role in financing competing forms of
transport would of course be to reduce government expenditures in
the other industries and require the users to pay a larger share of the costs.
By the nature of waterways and highways, it is difficult to envisage turning
them over to private enterprise and elimination of the interest-free
phenomenon. There is of course strong merit in requiring the highway and
waterway users to pay larger sums
—
particularly the latter. But
there are serious political obstacles to implementation of this approach.
Even if this is done, as the administration justifiably proposes, there is
still a case for Federal participation in the financing of the railways on
the basis of competitive relationships.
2. Externalities
A major argument for governmental participation in railroad
financing, as defined, is based upon the significant externalities from
the preservation of rail service.
One important externality is the lessening of congestion on the highways,
particularly routes in and near metropolitan areas and connecting major
cities. The growing truck traffic has added significantly to congestion
on many of these routes, with substantial discomfort for automobile drivers
and increased accidents. U.S. 9^-across southern Michigan is a good example,
as well as interstates leading out of Chicago in peak periods. This feature
has received virtually no attention in the framing of transport policy.
The problem is aggravated by the increased size of 'trucks concurrent with
the decline in the size of the average automobile. At the same time, the
rapid increase in truck traffic has clearly contributed to the deterioration
of the interstates at a much more rapid rate than expected. The congestion
It This has been widely recognized. Note for example, "Deterioration of the
Nation's Roads Accelerates," Wall Street Journal , Oct. 15, 1981, p. 48.
Note also U.S. General Accounting Office, "Excessive Truck Weight—An Expensive
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leads to demands for spending large sums of money on widening the interstates
and expressways, with the concomitant negative externalities.
A second externality is that of energy consumption and pollution.
Various studies generally have shown that rail, with any significant of
volume of traffic, is more energy efficient than trucking, and thus is less
vulnerable to potential increases in petroleum product prices and contributes
less to pollution, for a given volume of traffic. A few studies have questioned
this conclusion if all energy use in the railroad industry is taken into
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consideration, "but there appears to be strong evidence that on the whole
rail is more efficient. In recent months the rise in oil prices has stopped,
and priceshave even come down a little. But we may be living in a fool's
paradise; international incidents could easily trigger off another sharp
rise and shortages.
Since congestion and anergy-pollution issues are Federal in nature,
some Federal participation in financing of the railway industry is warranted.
At the state-local level, however, there are additional externalities. Loss
of a railroad line can cause economic loss to the area and preclude further
development of types that will not locate in an area without rail service.
There is strong evidence that most rail abandonments in the past have had
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very little impact on the areas served—but most of these were submarginal
lines that had no economic significance. But widespread abandonment of
present lines may result in far more serious adverse effects. No one questions
that substantial abandonment of rail mileage and concentration of traffic
on remaining lines is imperative. But state rail plans show clearly that
1. For example, E. Gregory, "Intermodal Fuel Consumption," U.S. Department
of Energy, 1980.
2. T. Doggett and Assoc, "Further Development and Use of the Transportation
Energy Conservation Network, Final Report," McLean, Va.: International Research
+ Technology Corp., 1975.
3. J.F. Due and B. Allen, "Railway Abandonment: Effects on the Areas
Served," Growth and Change
.
Vol. 8 (April 1977), pp. 8-14.
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sorae lines slated for a"bandonment offer "benefit/cost ratios of preservation
far in excess of one. The abandonment is sought because the present owners
are short of capital and wish to concentrate their efforts on their more
profitable routes, or because profitable segments are not connected to other
viable portions of the system. State-local effort to preserve these lines,
with transfer to local operation, is strongly justified, as well as the
use of public funds to aid in the transfer and rehabilitation. Federal
participation in such finaacing may also be justified on the grounds that
maintenance of an economic overall rail network has national implications,
and in some instances, because of interstate complications, Federal action
may be necessary to attain the desired results.
3. Survival in a Depression
Should the economy continue to slip into a depression, many railroads
will be in serious financial condition; thus far most have been saved by
heavy coal and grain movements and gains from partial deregulation. But
for the government to allow wholesale liquidation of rail lines that are
viable from a long range standpoint but are unable to withstand a serious
depression would be intolerable from the standpoint of economic efficiency.
k. Lines with Marginal Cost Less than Average Cost
The work of Theodore Keeler and Robert Harris over recent years has confirmed
has long been believed—but denied by earlier misspecified analysis—that
the economies of scale continue up to a very high volume of traffic,
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approached by not more than 25 percent of the rail network of the country.
Thus on most of the rail network, marginal cost is less than average cost.
The difference is probably not very significant on much of the mileage but
1. J.F. Due, "State Rail Plans and Programs," Quarterly Review of Economics
and Business
.
Vol. 19 (Summer 1979), pp. 109-30, and "State Rail Planning in
the Southwest," Texas Business Review
. Vol. 5k (July-August 1980), pp. 137-92.
2. R.G. Harris, "Rationalizing the Rail Freight Industry," Working Paper
SL 7705, Dept. of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1977.
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is substantial on the lighter traffic lines whose continuation is justified
on a benefit-cost basis. This situation is a classic example of the old
toll-bridge problem, and the answers are not simple and obvious. Economic
optimality requires that the rate level equal marginal cost—but this
will result in deficits. In the past the railroads solved this problem by-
value of service rate making—a second best approach under any circumstances,
and one whose continuation was made impossible by the rise of trucking. The
problem is most acute on long, relatively light traffic lines, but with
enough traffic to justify their continuation on a benefit-cost basis. The
overall cost level of the railroad is increased, with a tendency to hold
rates on other lines higher than necessary to cover all costs on those lines.
Accordingly, government financing, in one form or another, is warranted to
allow rates on heavy traffic routes approximating long run average and
marginal cost on those routes.
5- Labor—Key to Improved Earnings
There is increasing evidence that the railroad industry could, as a
whole, earn a reasonable return, with many of the lines now submarginal
being able to cover their costs, with drastic revision of labor union
contracts to increase labor productivity and bring wage costs to levels
comparable to those in other industries. Further reduction in crew size,
payment upon an 8 hour day basis regardless of miles, elimination of division
seniority, and much broader flexibility in the type of work that a worker
does are essential. The noncompetitive labor costs result from a series of
sources: reluctance of management to press hard for changes, lack of
adequate foresight on the part of union officials, and the obsolete craft
form of organization. The weaker roads would be unable to withstand a strike
if they forced a change; the more profitable roads do not want to impair
1. One of the few good analysis of this problem is to be found in U.S.
National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic Advisers,
Improving Railroad Productivity (Washington, D.C.: 1973)
•
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their short run profits. But much of the blame rests with the Federal
government, which consistently supported the labor position and included in
the GONEAIL legislation provisions that prevented attainment of the desired
restructuring and greatly impeded the ability of GONEAIL to operate profitably.
Some states added to the problem by economically idiotic full crew laws.
Governmental assistance for a breakthrough in the ' restructuring of labor
contracts is imperative. One approach is governmental provision of reasonable
severance pay for workers losing their jobs through operating changes and
abandonment. A second is the use of subsidy to force changes in labor
agreements. A very promising step was taken in the so-called CONRAH
conciliation agreement in the summer of 1981 . There is evidence that the
unions are coming to recognize that change is imperative, at least on the
weaker roads—but they must go much farther if the industry is to be viable.
The alternative may well be widespread loss of jobs.
6. Aid in Reorganizing the Structure of the Railroad System
Finally, governmental assistance, involving some financing, is desirable
to aid in the restructuring of the rail system of the country in an optimal
fashion. One aspect is consolidation of traffic on a smaller number of
main lines. If this is left strictly to the market, the results may not
be economically optimal. Five lines
between Chicago and Omaha were excessive—the worst example of duplication
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in the country. But the first of the five to fall by the wayside was the
Rock Island's line, as this was the weakest road, financially. But it is
not obvious that this was the route that should have gone first; it was the
only direct line through Des Moines and served other major shipping points
as well
.
1. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981.
2. There were originally six, until the Great Western was absorbed
by the Chicago + Northwestern and the main route dismembered.
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In addition, as noted above, there is substantial mileage that probably
can be operated profitably by local companies but not by the major systems.
Some assistance for the transfer, plus some funds for rehabilitation, may
be essential for the transfers. This may be primarily a state-local matter—but
some Federal participation can be justified.
Summary of Proposals
Basic to the recommendations is the acceptance of the philosophy that
the railway industry cannot be left entirely to the market mechanism, given
governmental participation in highway and waterway financing and operation, externa]
and the increasing returns nature of the railway industry. Specifically,
the following recommendations are offered:
1. Governmental provision of low interest rate capital to the railway
industry, to restore equality of capital with water and road transport.
2. State-local acquisition of light traffic lines with a benefit/ cost
ratio adequately in excess of one, provision of funds for rehabili-
tation, and assistance for continued operation when needed.
3. Federal assistance for reconstruction of the rail network, with
consolidation of traffic on a smaller number of main lines and
transfer of light traffic routes to local entities.
h. Provision of Federal and state funds for improvement of lines to
allow higher quality service to lessen truck-induced congestion
on the highways.
5. Continuing financial aid for light traffic lines where marginal
cost is less than average cost and the benefit/cost ratio is
adequately high.
6. Provision of Federal assistance to rail lines in a severe depression.
7. Federal and staire pressure via the subsidy requirements, Federally-
provided severance pay» and other means to bring imperative changes
in labor contracts.
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In the establishment of systems of financial aid, it is obvious that
they must be designed in such a way that (l) they do not merely cover deficits*
encouraging inefficiency, and (2) they do not preserve uneconomic provisions
in labor agreements and wage levels above '.those for comparable work.
The Obstacles to the Attainment of Optimality
Several years ago there was cause for optimism for improvements in govern-
ment policy toward railway financing—except for the policies toward
labor agreements. Today there is much less optimism, except for tax
concessions,1 shifting policy with regard to labor, and the greater rate freedom
for the carriers under the Staggers Act, which should to some extent improve
their financial position.
The current trend is toward reaffirmation of the old rule that the
railroads are strictly private sector enterprises, to be judged on the
criteria of the private sector—make a profit, or quit, without governmental
assistance. This is reflected in the attempt of the administration to
eliminate the Rail Services Assistance program, of great importance in
retaining lines that offer a benefit/cost ratio in excess of one but whose
main line owners are unwilling to continue them and in the transition to
local operation. The determination of the administration to return CONRAIL
to private ownership, either as a unit or through liquidation and sale of
parts is a further example, as are the policies toward AMTRAK . Congress has
served as a restraining influence to some degree.
This negative attitude toward governmental participation in financing
and in operation is partly a reflection of the influence of some prominent
economists in the field, such as James Miller, George Hilton, and others,
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and the proposals of the National Transportation Policy Study Commission.
The attitude was held by some officials of DOT under the Carter administration.
1. 1981 tax legislation allows the railroads to write off for tax purposes
$8 billion of track, saving the railroads up to $3 billion in tax over the
next five years. Wall Street Journal , Oct. 27, 1981, p. 25.
_t__ \r or\nr\ tp .s — „ i n ^*** -«4
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But basically it is a product of several major tenets of the Reagan
administration
:
1. All businesses, rail or otherwise, should stand on their own;
if they are not profitable they should liquidate. Railroads are no different
—
or not much different—from any other business—truck lines, automobile
manufacturers, fast food restaurants, furniture stores.
2. For ideological reasons, governments should not operate any type
of commercial activity.
3. The implicit denial of externalities—of gains to society from
retention of an effective rail system. In most respects externalities are
foreign to the thinking of the Chicago school, the philosophical underpinning
of the present administration.
k. The all-consuming objective of cutting the Federal budget—with
rail transportation a prime target from the beginning of implementation of
the administration's policies. Closely related is the determination to
balance the budget—in the belief
—
probably mistaken—that this will end
inflation and stimulate investment.
5. There appears to be an anti-rail bias in administration policy,
reflected in the hostile attitude toward AMTRAK and the denial of funds for
rail rapid transit projects, as well as the aspects noted above.
At the state-local level, a major obstacle is the resistance to present
tax levels and tax increases (the proposition 13 philosophy), coupled with
the deteriorating state and local financial position, which results from the
current decline in economic activity, high interest rates, and reduced Federal
assistance to the states. Some states—including traditionally conservative
ones such as New Hampshire and South Dakota—have acted vigorously in this
field. But state action over the next several years is certain to be restricted
by budgetary constraints.
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On the whole, the outlook is not promising. Rate deregulation and the
surprising initiative of local entrepreneurs interested in taking over
abandoned lines are the only promising elements in an otherwise discouraging
picture. The danger is serious erosion of the rail system before administra-
tions and attitudes change again.
10/22/81 si
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